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WHEN MORE INFORMATION REDUCES THE SPEED OF LEARNING
MATAN HAREL, ELCHANAN MOSSEL, PHILIPP STRACK, AND OMER TAMUZ
Abstract. We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private
signals, as well as the actions of the other. Our main finding is that increased interaction
between the agents can lower the speed of learning: when both agents observe each other,
learning is significantly slower than it is when one only observes the other. This slowdown is
driven by a process in which a consensus on the wrong action causes the agents to discount
new contrary evidence.
JEL classifications: C73, D82, D83
1. Introduction
Social learning, or learning from the actions of others, is an integral part of human behav-
ior. Children learn by imitating their parents and peers, and firms copy successful business
models and products1. Following Aumann [1976], a large literature2 studies two or more
agents who are informed by private signals which are set exogenously3. The agents learn by
repeatedly observing each other’s actions, which reveal information on their private signals.
The basic question that we tackle is the following: how does the amount of information
flowing between the agents affect the rate at which they learn? The Bayesian calculations
involved in such interactions are difficult to analyze, and pose significant technical obstacles
to answering this question, even when the structure of the private signals is simple (see,
e.g., Gale and Kariv [2003], Kanoria and Tamuz [2013]). We show the counter-intuitive
result that increased interaction (i.e., allowing more observations of actions) can lead to
significantly slower learning. We identify a mechanism contributing to this effect which
may be thought of as “Bayesian groupthink”: this occurs when initial interactions between
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Amir Dembo for insightful discussions of the large
deviation problems arising in this model. We likewise would like to thank Deniz Dizdar, Motty Perry for
helpful discussions. A large part of this research was conducted at Microsoft Research New England. E.M.
acknowledges the support of NSF grants DMS 1106999 and CCF 1320105, ONR grant number N00014-14-
1-0823 and grant 328025 from the Simons Foundation.
1See for example Bandura [1965], who demonstrates in a seminal contribution to psychology that 4 to 5 year
old kids imitate aggressive behavior towards a doll previously observed by an adult. Social learning is not
exclusive to humans; animals learn from the observing the behavior of their peers. See for example Hoppitt
[2013] for a study on cockroaches or Auersperg et al. [2014] for Goffin cockatoos.
2See for example Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982], Sebenius and Geanakoplos [1983], Parikh and
Krasucki [1990], Gale and Kariv [2003], Rosenberg et al. [2009], and more below.
3Rather than strategically acquired, as in the bandit literature.
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members of a group create a consensus on a wrong belief, causing each member to discount
new, contrary evidence, and thus re-enforcing the wrong consensus. From a social planner’s
perspective, it might therefore be advisable to let agents collect information independently
before allowing them to learn from each other.
Our model is a game of incomplete information and purely informational externalities,
where two agents repeatedly decide which of two actions to take. There is a state of nature
which determines which of the two alternatives is “correct”, but it is unknown to the agents
which one it is. The stage utility for choosing the correct action is one, and is zero otherwise.
Following the literature4 we consider agents who are myopic (i.e., fully discount the future),
so that at each period each one chooses the action which she thinks is more likely to be
correct. Every period each agent privately observes a binary, noisy signal regarding the
correct choice. Conditioned on the state of nature, the private signals are independent and
identically distributed.
When an agent observes only her own signals, the probability that she takes the wrong
action decays exponentially in the number of signals she observed, with some rate ap that
depends on p, the strength of the signals. In a complete information setting, where each
agent can observe the signals of both agents, the probability that one of them takes the
wrong action again decays exponentially, but with rate 2 ap, since she sees twice as many
signals per time period.
We study two intermediate informational settings, in which information is exchanged
between the agents, but they do not observe each other’s private signals.
(1) Unidirectional observation. Agent 1 can see her own signals, and in addition sees
agent 2’s actions. Agent 2 can only see her own signals.
(2) Bidirectional observation. Each agent can see her own signals and the other agent’s
actions, but again not the other agent’s signals.
In the first case, we find that agent 1’s rate of learning is between 3/2 ap and 25/16 ap; the
exact value depends on p, and tends towards the former for stronger signals and towards
the latter for weaker signals (Theorem 11). Regardless of the value of p, the learning rate
is strictly between ap and 2ap, so that agent 1 learns exponentially faster than she would
based solely on her own private signals, but exponentially slower than she would if she could
also observe agent 2’s private signals. The latter inefficiency stems from the fact that the
action is only a coarse signal about the belief. Surprisingly, we find that the rate of learning
stays the same if only the last action of agent 2 is observed by agent 1, rather than all of her
actions (Theorem 14).
4E.g., Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982], Sebenius and Geanakoplos [1983], Gale and Kariv [2003].
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Our main result, and the one that requires the most significant technical effort, applies to
the case where both agents observes each other’s actions. There, we show an upper bound
on the rate of learning, and, in particular, we show that agent 1’s rate of learning is here
strictly slower than it is in the previous case (Theorem 21). Na¨ıvely, one may have guessed
that in this case the rate should have been higher, since the only difference is that now agent
2 can also see the actions of agent 1, so “more information is exchanged”. However, as we
show, adding this information to agent 2 makes her actions less informative for agent 1, and
thus lowers agent 1’s rate of learning.
An alternative way of understanding this result is by analysis of what we call information
transmission efficiency; this is a way of quantifying how much of an agent’s private informa-
tion - measured as an informationally equivalent fraction of her private signals - is revealed
by her actions. Actions that carry no information have 0% efficiency, and actions that reveal
all the private signals have 100% efficiency. An agent’s actions have (say) 25% efficiency if
they carry as much information as do 25% of the agent’s private signals. We find that in the
case of unidirectional observations the efficiency is between 50% and 57%, depending on the
strength of the private signals. In the case of bidirectional observations the efficiency is at
most 38%.
To obtain an upper bound on the speed of learning in the bidirectional observation case,
we consider the event that both agents make the wrong choice in every period, and show
that its likelihood is exponentially higher than the probability of agent 1 making a mistake
in the unidirectional setting. Typically, such an event occurs when the initial signals are
wrong for both agents, causing them both to choose the wrong action. Later, the private
signals of each agent indicate the correct action, but both agents misestimate the the other
agent’s signal, and so still both choose the wrong action (Theorem 22); this can be thought
of as a model of “Bayesian groupthink”.
The analysis of this process requires the overcoming of significant technical difficulties.
These are due to the fact that an agent’s myopic actions are complex functions of the complete
private history - namely the other’s actions and the agent’s own actions and signals - which in
particular admit no simple closed-form expressions (see, e.g., Gale and Kariv [2003], Kanoria
and Tamuz [2013]). As the agent’s behavior cannot be described explicitly, we focus on the
event that both agents have been wrong at all time periods. We show that the probability
of this event can asymptotically be characterized by a recursive equation which determines
its exponential rate. Our main mathematical tools come from large deviation theory, and in
particular we use Sanov’s Theorem, to which we provide a short introduction.
Relation to the literature. Starting with the seminal “Agreeing to disagree” paper of
Aumann [1976], a large literature has been devoted to the study of the evolution of opinions
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and actions of interacting Bayesian agents, with notable contributions by Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis [1982], Sebenius and Geanakoplos [1983], McKelvey and Page [1986], Parikh
and Krasucki [1990], Gale and Kariv [2003] and others. By-and-large, it has been shown that
barring pathological cases, agents who exchange enough information will eventually agree.
For example, Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille [2009] study games with pure informational
externalities where agents observe private signals and learn from the actions of others. They
show that agents will eventually act myopically and only disagree when indifferent. More
recently, some authors have considered the question of whether or not the agents agree on
the correct action. Mossel, Sly, and Tamuz [2012a,b, 2014] provide conditions under which
agreement implies that the correct action is taken in a setting with infinitely many agents,
and Arieli and Mueller-Frank [2013] explore the question of when beliefs can be inferred from
actions, which also leads to learning the correct action. Ostrovsky [2012] provides sufficient
conditions for information aggregation in financial markets with privately informed traders.
Whereas this literature focuses on whether agents agree in the long-run and whether
they learn the correct action, we study the speed at which agents learn the correct action.
Specifically, as both agents in our model observe an equally informative signal every period,
they learn the state with probably one from their own signals and consequently agree in the
long-run. The interesting remaining question, then, is the rate at which this happens.
Closely related to our setup, Ellison and Fudenberg [1995] study a setting of social learning
where agents observe the signals ofN other random agents during each period, and use simple
heuristic decision rules to choose their actions.
Also related is a series of papers on information percolation: Duffie and Manso [2007],
Duffie, Malamud, and Manso [2009], Duffie, Giroux, and Manso [2010], Duffie, Malamud,
and Manso [2014] study the exponential rate of learning in a continuum of agents who learn
about each other’s private signals. Recently, Jadbabaie, Molavi, and Tahbaz-Salehi [2013]
study a model very similar to ours, but on a general social network, and with boundedly-
rational agents. They too use exponential rates as a natural way to quantify the speed of
learning. A model with two Bayesian agents who learn an underlying binary state from
private signals is studied by Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson [2008, 2013]. In their
model the agents do not observe each other, but have correlated signals.
In contrast, the literature on social learning in bandit problems focuses on aspects of
information acquisition (e.g., Bolton and Harris [1999], Keller, Rady, and Cripps [2005],
Keller and Rady [2010], Heidhues, Rady, and Strack [2014]). Signals in this literature are
usually publicly observable, and different actions lead to signals of different informativeness.
This leads to an inefficiency which arises from a decrease in information acquisition, as agents
can free-ride on the information of others. We, on the other hand, study the inefficiency
arising from the fact that only actions are observable, while signals are private information.
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Furthermore, we abstract away any strategic experimentation considerations, by assuming
that information arrives independently of the actions taken.
2. Definitions and results
In this section we formally define our model and give an overview of our results.
2.1. The probability space. We consider a state of nature Θ that takes values in {+1,−1},
both of which are a priori equally likely: P[Θ = +1] = 1/2. There are two agents, indexed by
i ∈ {1, 2}, and n time periods. Each agent observes a sequence of n private signals {X ik}k≤n,
which are i.i.d. conditional on the state of the world Θ. The signal X ik ∈ {−1, 1} observed
by agent i in period k is equal to the true state of the world Θ with probability p and equals
−Θ with probability 1− p:
P
[
X ik = Θ
∣∣Θ] = p .
We will use P+[·] to denote P [·|Θ = +1], and likewise P−[·] to denote P [·|Θ = −1]. We
also denote by Sin =
∑
k≤nX
i
k the difference between the number of +1 and −1 signals agent
i observed.
2.2. The agent’s actions. We define four scenarios, which differ by the set of periods in
which agents are allowed to observe the other’s actions. We assume throughout that the
agents share the uniform prior regarding the state of nature Θ. This is not necessary for our
results, but simplifies the proofs, some of which are already laborious.
2.2.1. No observation. Our first setting is the baseline scenario, in which each agent chooses
an action based on her own private signals, and does not observe the other agent’s actions.
Since the agents are myopic, each agent’s action Ain is given in this case by her best guess
as to the value of state of the world Θ - i.e.
Ain := arg max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
Θ = θ
∣∣ {X ik}k≤n] .
If the arg max is not unique, we let Ain take the value 0 (and do the same below for B
i
n, C
i
n
and Din); thus we assume that the stage utility of choosing 0 is 1/2. We do this to make the
notation and analysis simpler - the results would be identical for any other choice one could
make (e.g., always choose +1, or choose either +1 or −1 at random).
2.2.2. Observing the final action unidirectionally. Our second setting is one in which agent
2 still only observes her own signals, and therefore her actions are A2n, as above. Agent 1, at
time n, observes agent 2’s penultimate action A2n−1, in addition to her own private signals.
Hence agent 1’s action B1n is given in this case by
B1n := arg max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
Θ = θ
∣∣ {X1k}k≤n, A2n−1] .
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2.2.3. Observing all actions unidirectionally. This setting is a small modification of the pre-
vious: the difference is that agent 1 now gets to observe all of agent 2’s past actions. Hence
agent 1’s action C1n is given by
C1n := arg max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
Θ = θ
∣∣ {X1k}k≤n, {A2k}k<n] .
2.2.4. Observing all actions bidirectionally. Finally, we consider the case in which both
agents, at each time period, observe their own private signals as well as the other’s action.
Hence Din, the action of agent i at period n, is given recursively by
Din := arg max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
Θ = θ
∣∣ {X ik}k≤n, {D3−ik }k<n] .
Note that here and below 3− i is the “other agent”; if i = 1 then 3− i = 2 and vice versa.
Din is hence the action agent i would take when she could observe D
3−i
k at all previous time
periods k in addition to her own signal.
Let
Gn =
⋂
k≤n,i∈{1,2}
{Dik 6= +1} .
This is the event that both agents do not take the action +1, in all time periods. Conditioned
on Θ = +1, Gn implies that they both choose the wrong action in all periods up to n.
2.3. Asymptotics. We are interested in the probability that an agent’s best estimate does
not equal the state of the world Θ. Since this probability vanishes exponentially fast in n,
we scale the probabilities to extract the exponential rate of vanishing. Specifically, we define
ap := lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
Ain 6= Θ
]
.
Note that by symmetry, ap is not a function of i, and thus depends only on p. Continuing
the convention of using lowercase letters for rate functions, we let
bp := lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
B1n 6= Θ
]
cp := lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
C1n 6= Θ
]
.
We also define
dp := lim sup
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
Din 6= Θ
]
gp := lim sup
n→∞
− 1
n
logP [Gn|Θ = +1] .
Note that it is not immediate that the limits ap, bp and cp exist; we prove that they indeed
do. We were not able to do the same in the case of dp and gp, and hence chose to consider
the limits superior, which always exist.
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Since A1n is measurable with respect to the σ-algebra that defines B
1
n, while B
1
n requires less
information than C1n, we immediately conclude C
1
n is more likely to be correct than B
1
n, which
is better than A1n. Due to the negative sign in the definition, we see that ap ≤ bp ≤ cp. We
show that the first inequality is strict, while the second is actually an equality: ap < bp = cp.
It seems a priori difficult to guess the relation of dp to these numbers. As it turns out, we
show that dp < bp; agent 1 learns more slowly if both agents observe each other’s actions,
as compared to the case in which only she observes the other’s last action. We show this by
showing that gp < bp; it follows that dp ≤ gp from the definition of Gn, as the event that,
conditioned on Θ = +1, both agents are wrong at all periods.
2.4. Main results. For the reader’s convenience, we gather all of our main results in The-
orem 1 below. To state this theorem we will need to define Kullback-Leibler Divergence.
For notational convenience, let q := 1 − p and likewise q′ = 1 − p′ and qˆ = 1 − pˆ. Letting
µ and ν be two measures with the same, finite support, we recall that the Kullback-Leibler
divergence is defined as
DKL(ν ||µ) :=
∑
i
ν(i) log
ν(i)
µ(i)
.
If ν is the Bernoulli distribution which assigns probability p′ to +1 and q′ to −1 and µ is
the Bernoulli distribution which assigns probability p to 1, we will slightly abuse notation,
and refer to the divergence as DKL(p
′ || p). Expanding this out explicitly, we see that
DKL(p
′ || p) = p′ log p
′
p
+ q′ log
q′
q
.
Fixing p, the function DKL(·||p) is nonnegative, has a unique zero at p, and is continuous
and strictly convex (see, e.g., Cover and Thomas [2012]).
Theorem 1 (The Asymptotic Rate of Learning).
(1) ap, the rate of learning in the no observation case is given by
ap = DKL (1/2 || p) .
(2) bp, the rate of learning when unilaterally observing the last action of the other agent
equals cp, the rate when observing all her past signals, and is given by
bp = cp = DKL(p
∗ || p) + ap ,
where t∗ = ap/ log(p/q) and p∗ = 12 (1 + t
∗). Thus bp = cp > ap.
(3) dp, the rate of learning when observing actions bidirectionally is bounded by gn, which
in turn is strictly less than bp:
dp ≤ gp = DKL(1− pˆ || p) < bp .
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Here pˆ is the unique solution to 2DKL(pˆ || p) = DKL(1− pˆ || p) satisfying pˆ < p.
We note that while (1) follows almost immediately from Sanov’s Theorem, (2) requires
more detailed analysis, and (3) constitutes the main technical effort of this paper. The
results in this theorem appear as separate theorems in the following sections.
2.5. Information transmission efficiency. An alternative way of quantifying the amount
of information revealed by an agent’s actions is what we call the information transmission
efficiency. Consider agent 2 observing agent 1’s actions, and imagine that agent 2 was
instead offered to observe some fraction of agent 1’s private signals. What fraction of the
signals would agent 2 need to observe in order to have, in the long run, the same or better
probability of choosing the correct actions?
To define this term formally, consider the case that agent 1, instead of observing agent 2’s
actions, observes some fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of agent 2’s private signals. Specifically, let agent
1, at period n, observe her own private signals {X1k}k≤n, as well as the first bαnc private
signals of agent 2, {X2k}k≤αn. Note that it does not matter which bαnc signals the agent is
allowed to observe, since they are i.i.d., and thus equally informative. We denote by Hαn the
best guess of agent 1 when she observes the other agent’s bαnc signals in addition to her
own signals:
Hαn = arg max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
Θ = θ
∣∣ {X1k}k≤n, {X2k}k≤αn] .
We will call a sequence of random variables {In}n an information structure if Ik is a
function of the private signals observed (by both agents) until time k. For example, in the
unidirectional case where agent 1 observes agent 2’s actions, In = {A2k}k<n is the relevant
information structure. In the bidirectional case where both observe each other’s actions,
In = {D2k}k<n is the relevant informational structure.
Definition 2 (Information Transmission Efficiency). The transmission efficiency α(I) of an
information structure {In}n is the supremum over α¯ ∈ [0, 1] such that for all sufficiently
large n
max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
θ = Θ
∣∣{X1k}k≤n, In] > P [H α¯n = Θ] .
That is, α(I) is the largest fraction of private signals of agent 1 such that observing this
fraction of signals, and agent 2’s signals, results in a lower probability of choosing the correct
action, as compared to choosing it given agent 2’s signals and In.
A particular reason to consider asymptotic rates is the following connection to information
transmission efficiency.
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Proposition 3. The information transmission efficiency is given by
α(I) =
β
ap
− 1 ,
where β is the minimal asymptotic rate of learning of agent 1 under the information structure
I
β = lim inf
n→∞
− 1
n
log
(
max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
θ 6= Θ∣∣{X1k}k≤n, In]) .
Proof of Proposition 3. As signals are i.i.d., an agent is equally likely to be correct if she
observed α¯n of the other agent’s signals, in addition to her own n signals and in the situation
where she observed (1 + α¯)n of her own signals. It thus follows from the first result of
Theorem 1 that the probability of being wrong when observing a fraction α¯ of the other
agents signals is given by5
P [H α¯n 6= Θ] = e−ap(1+α)n+o(n).(1)
By the definition of β we have that
max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
θ 6= Θ∣∣{X1k}k≤n, In] ≤ e−β n+o(n).(2)
Thus, for all sufficiently large n it follows that (1) > (2) if ap(1 + α¯) < β. Rearranging for
α¯ gives that (1) > (2) for all α¯ < β
ap
− 1 and taking the supremum over this set yields
α(I) ≥ β
ap
− 1 .
Conversely, by the definition of the limit inferior, we have that (1) < (2) if ap(1 +α) > β for
some arbitrary large n and thus α(I) ≤ β
ap
− 1 . 
2.5.1. Information Transmission with Unidirectional Information. Given our results on the
asymptotic rate bp, cp from Theorem 1 it follows from Proposition 3 that the information
transmission efficiency if either the last or all actions of the other agent are observed is given
by
bp
ap
− 1 = cp
ap
− 1 = DKL(p
∗ || p)
DKL(1/2 || p) .
As shown in Figure 1, the information transmission efficiency depends on p and ranges
between 1/2 = 50% and 9/16 ≈ 57%. Thus, an agent is more likely to be correct if she
observes a fraction higher than 9/16 of the other agent signals compared to observing all the
other agents actions. Conversely, she is less likely to be correct if she observes less than half
of the other agent’s signals.
5Recall that a function f : N→ R satisfies f(n) = o(n) if and only if limn→∞ f(n)n = 0 .
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Figure 1. The information transmission efficiency, as a function of p, in the
case of unidirectional observations (blue, higher line) and the upper bound for
the case of bidirectional observations (red, lower line).
2.5.2. Information Transmission with Bidirectional Information. Our bound on dp implies
that the efficiency in the bidirectional observation case is bounded from above by
dp
ap
− 1 .
Especially, the information transmission efficiency is lower than in the unidirectional case,
and is in particular at most 37%, as can be shown by a simple numerical calculation. Figure 1
illustrates the information transmission efficiency in the unidirectional and the bidirectional
case and shows that the bidirectional information exchange leads to an additional loss in
information transmission efficiency of at lease 18%.
In the following sections we derive the results about asymptotic rates stated in Theorem 1.
3. No observations
In this section we study the case that each agent observes only her own actions
Ain := arg max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
Θ = θ
∣∣ {X ik}k≤n] .
Her exponential rate of learning in this setting is
ap := lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
Ain 6= Θ
]
.
We show that
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Theorem 4. ap = DKL(1/2 || p).
The proof is completely standard, but we provide it here in its entirety in order to introduce
some tools that will be useful later. An important tool in our proofs is Sanov’s Theorem
(Sanov [1957], or see, e.g., Dembo and Zeitouni, 1998, Theorem 2.1.10). To motivate it, note
that when Θ = +1, the average signal Sin/n =
1
n
∑
X ik tends to its expectation 2p − 1, by
the law of large numbers. Because E
[
exp(Xki )
]
<∞, Markov’s inequality implies that Sin/n
will significantly deviate from 2p− 1 with exponentially small probability in n.
By the Central Limit Theorem, Sin/n will significantly deviate from 2p − 1 with expo-
nentially small probability. Sanov’s Theorem is a calculation of this exponential vanishing
rate.
Theorem 5 (Sanov’s Theorem). For any p < p we have that
lim
n→∞
− log 1
n
P+[2p− 1 ≤ Sin/n ≤ 2p− 1] =

DKL(p || p) when p < p
0 when p ≤ p ≤ p
DKL(p || p) when p < p
·
We are interested in calculating
ap := lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
A1n 6= Θ
]
.
where A1n is agent 1’s best guess of Θ, given her private signals {X1k}k≤n. The following
claim is an easy consequence of the definition of A1n:
Claim 6.
Ain = sgnS
i
n.
Proof. The log-likelihood ratio of Θ, given {X1k}k≤n, is
LAn := log
P [Θ = +1 | {X1k}]
P [Θ = −1 | {X1k}]
= log
P+[{X1k}]
P−[{X1k}]
,
where the second equality is Bayes’ Rule.
Since the variables {X1k} are conditionally independent, we can explicitly compute the
right hand side to be
LAn = S
1
n · log(p/q) .
Note that LAn = 0 if and only if P [Θ = +1|{X1k}] = 12 , and furthermore the latter is greater
then half (resp. less then half) if the former is positive (resp. negative). Hence A1n = sgnL
A
n ,
and so A1n = sgnSn. 
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Figure 2. When given signals with strength p, an agent who does not
observe the other agent chooses the wrong action at time n with probability
e−ap·n+o(n), where ap = DKL(1/2 || p).
By symmetry, {A1n 6= Θ} has twice the probability of {A1n 6= +1,Θ = +1} = {S1n ≤ 0,Θ =
+1}. Hence, by Claim 6 and by conditioning on Θ = +1, we can conclude that
P
[
A1n 6= Θ
]
= P+[S1n ≤ 0] = P+[−1 ≤ S1n/n ≤ 0] ,(3)
where the second equality follows from the fact that P [−1 ≤ S1n/n] = 1. We remind the
reader that P+[·] = P [·|Θ = +1].
Since the X ik’s are independent conditional on Θ, we can now apply Sanov’s Theorem,
substituting p = 0 and p = 1
2
:
ap = lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
A1n 6= Θ
]
= lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP+[−1 ≤ S1n/n ≤ 0] = DKL(1/2 || p) ,(4)
where the last equality is Sanov’s Theorem (for p > 1
2
), and the second equality is a conse-
quence of (3). This completes the proof of Theorem 4; this is also part (1) of Theorem 1.
Figure 2 illustrates how ap varies with p.
4. Observing the final action
We now move on to analyze the setting in which agent 2 only observes her private signal,
but agent 1 also observes agent 2’s last action. Agent 2’s actions are hence given by
A2n := arg max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
Θ = θ
∣∣ {X2k}k≤n] ,
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and agent 1’s actions are given by
B1n := arg max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
Θ = θ
∣∣ {X1k}k≤n, A2n−1] .
We calculate
bp := lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
B1n 6= Θ
]
,
which is agents 1’s rate of learning in this setting. As in the previous section, we can analyze
the event {B1n 6= +1,Θ = +1} by symmetry, and we use the log-likelihood ratio to find when
B1n 6= +1. Given {X1k} and {A2n}, the relevant log-likelihood ratio is
LBn := log
P+[{X1k}, A2n−1]
P−[{X1k}, A2n−1]
.
Analogously to A1n and L
A
n in the previous section, B
1
n is equal to the the sign of L
B
n . Using
the conditional independence of the agents’ signals, we see that
LBn = log
P+[{X1k}]
P−[{X1k}]
+ log
P+[A2n−1]
P−[A2n−1]
.(5)
The first logarithm is equal to S1n log(p/q), as it was in the previous section. As for the
second expression, it is easy to see that
log
P+[A2n−1]
P−[A2n−1]
= 1{A2n−1=+1} log
P
[
A2n−1 = Θ
]
P
[
A2n−1 6= Θ
] + 1{A2n−1=−1} log P
[
A2n−1 6= Θ
]
P
[
A2n−1 = Θ
]
= A2n−1 log
P
[
A2n−1 = Θ
]
P
[
A2n−1 6= Θ
] .
It thus follows that the log-likelihood ratio LBn is given by
LnB = sgn(S
1
n) |S1n| log(p/q) + A2n−1 log
P
[
A2n−1 = Θ
]
P
[
A2n−1 6= Θ
] .(6)
As the action taken by agent 1 is given by the sign of the log-likelihood ratio, we have the
following proposition describing agent 1’s behavior:
Proposition 7. Let the threshold signal t∗n be given by
(7) t∗n =
1
n
log
P
[
A2n−1 = Θ
]
P
[
A2n−1 6= Θ
] log(p/q)−1 .
Then agent 1’s action B1n is given by:
B1n =

sgnSn if |Sn/n| > t∗n or A2n−1 = 0
A2n−1 if |Sn/n| < t∗n and A2n−1 6= 0
sgn
(
A2n−1 + sgnSn
)
if |Sn/n| = t∗n
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In the first case, agent 1 has such a strong private signal that she ignores agent 2’s observed
action, follows her own signal, and thus and chooses B1n = sgnSn. In the second case agent
2 has the weakest possible private signal (since S2n−1 = 0), and so agent 1 again follows her
own signal and chooses B1n = sgnSn. In the third case, agent 1 has a weak signal but agent
2 does not, and so agent 1 follows agent 2’s action and chooses B1n = A
2
n−1. In the fourth
case, agent 1’s private signal is as strong as agent 2’s, and so agent 1’s action will depend
on both signals. We formally prove this proposition in the appendix.
The following is an immediate corollary.
Corollary 8. Agent 1’s action B1n is equal to +1, unless one of the three following disjoint
events occur:
(1) Sn/n < −t∗n.
(2) −t∗n ≤ Sn/n ≤ t∗n and A2n−1 = −1.
(3) −t∗n ≤ Sn/n ≤ 0 and A2n−1 = 0.
The threshold signal t∗n defined in (7) plays a crucial role in the description of the behavior
of agent 1. While it is hard to calculate the threshold t∗n explicitly for small n, the asymptotic
behavior follows easily from our results of the previous section.
Lemma 9. The asymptotic threshold signal t∗ = limn→∞ t∗n is given by
t∗ =
ap
log(p/q)
.
Proof. Since the probability that agent 2 chooses the right action converges to one (i.e.,
limn P
[
A2n−1 = Θ
]
= 1), and using our characterization of the asymptotic rate of learning in
the single agent case derived in (4), we have that
lim
n→∞
t∗n =
1
log(p/q)
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
P
[
A2n−1 = Θ
]
P
[
A2n−1 6= Θ
]
=
1
log(p/q)
lim
n→∞
1
n
(
logP
[
A2n−1 = Θ
]− logP [A2n−1 6= Θ])
=
1
log(p/q)
lim
n→∞
− 1
n− 1 logP
[
A2n−1 6= Θ
] · lim
n→∞
n− 1
n
=
ap
log(p/q)
. 
As a consequence of Corollary 7 the probability that agent 1 makes an incorrect guess is
given by
P
[
B1n 6= Θ
]
= P+[B1n 6= +1]
= P+[Sn/n < −t∗n]
+ P+[−t∗n ≤ Sn/n ≤ t∗n] · P+[A2n = −1](8)
+ P+[−t∗n ≤ Sn/n ≤ 0] · P+[A2n = 0] .
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As the asymptotic rate of a sum is the minimum of the rates of the summands, we calculate
the rate of the above three summands separately. First, if we denote
p∗ = 1
2
(1 + t∗)
as earlier, and likewise denote q∗ = 1 − p∗, then it follows from a generalized version of
Sanov’s Theorem (Corollary 23) that
lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP+[S1n/n < −t∗n] = lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP+[S1n/n < −t∗] = DKL(q∗|| p) .
For the second event it follows from the generalized version of Sanov’s Theorem that the
asymptotic rate is given by
lim
n→∞
− 1
n
log
(
P+[−t∗n < S1n/n < t∗n] · P+[A2n = −1]
)
= lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP+[S1n/n < t∗] + lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP+[S2n < 0]
= DKL(p
∗||p) +DKL(1/2||p) .
For the third event the asymptotic rate satisfies
lim inf
n→∞
− 1
n
log
(
P+[−t∗n < S1n/n < 0] · P+[A2n = 0]
)
= lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP+[S1n/n ≤ 0] + lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP+[S2n = 0] .
The first limit is equal to DKL(1/2||p), by Sanov’s Theorem. The second is likewise equal
to DKL(1/2||p); this follows from the fact that using an elementary combinatorial argument,
P+[S2n = 0] can be calculated explicitly:
P+[S2n = 0] =
(
2n
n
)
pnqn.
Hence the rate of the last summand in (8) is 2DKL(1/2||p). Gathering the rates of the three
summands and taking the minimum, we have that
bp = lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
B1n 6= Θ
]
= min{DKL(q∗||p) , DKL(p∗||p) +DKL(1/2||p) , 2DKL(1/2||p)}.
Now, 2DKL(1/2||p) > DKL(p∗||p) +DKL(1/2||p), since 1/2 < p∗ < p, and by the monotonicity
of DKL(·||p). Hence
bp = min{DKL(q∗||p) , DKL(p∗||p) +DKL(1/2||p)}.
Perhaps surprisingly, it so happens that these two numbers are equal: DKL(q
∗||p) = DKL(p∗||p)+
DKL(1/2||p); this can be easily shown by substituting the definitions of p∗, q∗ and the
Kullback-Leibler divergence.
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To understand the intuitive reason for this, is it important to understand a general prin-
ciple of large deviations, which follows immediately from Sanov’s Theorem, and which we
call the “smallest possible mistake” principle: conditioned on an agent being wrong - i.e.,
Sn/n ≤ p < p - her mistake will be the smallest possible: i.e., Sn/n ≈ p. Formally,
Theorem 10 (Smallest possible mistake). For all p < p and  > 0,
lim
n→∞
P+
[
p−  ≤ S1n/n | S1n/n ≤ p
]
= 1.
Now, condition, as above, on Θ = +1, and consider the two events whose rates are
DKL(q
∗||p) and DKL(p∗||p) + DKL(1/2||p). The first is that Sn/n < −t∗, and the second is
that |Sn/n| ≤ t∗ and A2n−1 = −1. By the argument above, the first implies that Sn/n ≈ −t∗,
and that second implies that Sn/n ≈ t∗. But this is precisely the threshold in which agent 1
is indifferent in choosing between following her own signal and that of agent 2! Clearly this
is because both signals have the same probability of being wrong, by the optimality of agent
1’s choice. Thus these two events have the same rate.
We have therefore shown that bp = DKL(q
∗||p) = DKL(p∗||p) + DKL(1/2||p). Since ap =
DKL(1/2||p), we have completed the proof of the main theorem of this section; this result also
appears in part (2) of Theorem 1.
Theorem 11. bp = DKL(p
∗ || p) + ap.
The relation between bp and p is illustrated in Figure 3.
As mentioned in the introduction, bp varies between 1.5ap = 24/16ap and 1.5626ap =
25/16ap. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
5. Observing all actions unidirectionally
In this section we consider the setting in which agent 1 observes each action of agent 2,
rather than just the last one, as in the previous section. Hence agent 2’s actions are again
given by
A2n := arg max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
Θ = θ
∣∣ {X2k}k≤n] ,
and agent 1’s actions are given by
C1n := arg max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
Θ = θ
∣∣ {X1k}k≤n, {A2k}k<n] .
We show that here, agent 1’s learning rate
cp := lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
C1n 6= Θ
]
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Figure 3. When given signals with strength p, an agent who observes the
other agent chooses the wrong action at time n with probability e−bp·n+o(n),
where bp = DKL(p
∗ || p) + ap; both bp (red, higher line) and ap (blue, lower
line) are shown.
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Figure 4. bp varies between 1.5ap and 1.5625ap.
is the same as in the previous section, despite the fact that she has strictly more information
available to her. Of course, her probability of choosing the wrong action is always smaller
than in the previous section. However, the exponential rate is identical.
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We wish to show that cp = bp. Since B
i
n is measurable with respect to the σ-algebra
generated by {X1k} and {A2k}, we know that Cin is more likely to correctly estimate Θ than
Bin. Therefore, the error probability decreases, and bp ≤ cp. The proof will be complete if we
knew that cp ≤ bp. Probabilistically, this would follow if there was an event Fn that implied
that agent 1 chooses an action C1n 6= +1, and conditioned on Θ = +1 had the asymptotic
rate function bp - i.e.
lim inf
n→∞
− 1
n
logP+[Fn] ≤ bp + ε ,
for any ε > 0 sufficiently small. We will show that the event Fn that agent 1’s private signal
is not too positive, and that agent 2 always chooses the wrong action −1 satisfies these
requirements
Fn = {S1n < t∗(1− ε)n, {A2k = −1}k≤n} .
Note that the second part of the definition of Fn can be written as {S2k < 0}k≤n, by Claim 6.
First, we calculate the probability of Fn, conditioned on Θ = +1. This can be decomposed
into a product, because of the conditional independence of the two agents’ private signals:
P+[Fn] = P+[S1n < t∗(1− ε)n] · P+[{S2k < 0}k≤n] .(9)
The first probability is easy to calculate via Sanov’s Theorem. For the second expression,
we state a corollary of the reflection principle, sometimes referred to as “Bertrand’s Ballot
Theorem” (Bertrand [1887], or see, e.g., [Durrett, 1996, pg. 198]):
Theorem 12 (Bertrand’s Ballot Theorem). For any negative integer x < 0 and any θ ∈
{+1,−1}
P
[{S2k < 0}k<n, Sn = x ∣∣Θ = θ] = |x|n P [Sn = x |Θ = θ] .
As a consequence of the Ballot Theorem,
P+[{S2k < 0}k≤n] ≥
1
n
P+[S2n < 0] .
Substituting this into (9), the expression for the probability of Fn, we find that
− 1
n
logP+[Fn] ≤ log n
n
− 1
n
(
logP+[S1n/n < t∗(1− ε)] + logP+[S2n < 0]
)
.
If we take a limit inferior of both sides, the log n/n term vanishes, and we are left with an
expression that is nearly identical to the one we found in the previous section. Hence by the
same considerations the rate function of Fn is bounded below by
DKL(p
∗ − 1
2
t∗ε || p) +DKL (1/2 || p) .
Furthermore, we have shown before that
DKL(p
∗ || p) +DKL (1/2 || p) = bp .
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It therefore remains to be shown that agent 1 takes the action −1 if she observed agent
2 taking the action −1 in all prior periods and if she would have taken the action −1 if she
only observed that agent 2 took the action −1 in the last period (and no information about
2’s prior actions).
Proposition 13. Fn implies {C1n 6= +1}.
We prove Proposition 13 in the appendix. Intuitively, seeing agent 2 take the action −1
more often can only be evidence of the fact that agent 2 observed the signal −1 more often,
which makes the state −1 more likely from agent 1’s perspective.
The proof shows this by first arguing that the event that agent 2 takes the wrong action
in all period k < n is less likely than that she takes the wrong action in period k = n− 1.
We thus conclude that
Theorem 14. cp = bp.
This also appears in part (2) of Theorem 1.
6. Observing all actions bidirectionally
In this section we consider the case that each agent, at each time period, observes both
her private signal and the other agent’s action, which, since the agents are myopic, is the
other agent’s best estimate of the state of nature. That is, agent i’s action at time n is given
by
Din := arg max
θ∈{+1,−1}
P
[
Θ = θ
∣∣ {X ik}k≤n, {D3−ik }k<n] .
We are interested in calculating
dp := lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
Din 6= Θ
]
.
However, in trying to analyze this expression we encountered significant obstacles, and were
indeed unable to even prove that the limit exists. These stem from the complexity of the
recursive definition of Din.
In lieu, we resort to studying the limit superior
dp := lim sup
n→∞
− 1
n
logP
[
Din 6= Θ
]
,
which is guaranteed to exist; note that by symmetry, dp does not depend on i.
We show that dp < cp = bp - that is, the probability of taking the wrong action in this
setting is (for n large enough) exponentially higher than in the previous two. Thus we in
fact do not lose much by resorting to the study of dp rather than dp. Still, the interesting
questions remain: does the limit dp exist, and can it be calculated? A natural conjecture is
that dp exists and is equal to dp.
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As mentioned above, it is difficult to analyze the probability of the event Din 6= Θ, i.e.,
the event that agent i chooses the wrong action at time n, in the setting of bidirectional
observations. We find, however, that an easier probability to calculate (or at least bound
from below) is that of the event that both agents choose the wrong actions at all time periods
1, 2, . . . , n. Accordingly, let
Gn =
⋂
k≤n,i∈{1,2}
{Dik 6= +1} .
Conditioned on Θ = +1, this is the event that both agents choose a wrong action in all time
periods. Since Gn implies {D1n 6= +1}, it follows that
gp := lim sup
n
− 1
n
logP+[Gn] ≥ dp .
We will therefore prove that dp < bp by showing that gp < bp; that is, the probability of both
agents choosing the wrong action in the bidirectional case is exponentially higher than that
of agent 1 choosing the wrong action at time n, in the unidirectional case.
Now, the event Gn can be written as G
1
n ∩G2n, where Gin is the event that agent i chooses
the wrong action at every period up to n. To calculate the probability of Gn, it would
of course have been convenient if these two events were independent, conditioned on Θ.
However, due to the fact that the agents’ actions are strongly intertwined, G1n and G
2
n are
not independent; given that agent 1 played −1 at all time periods, agent 2 is clearly more
likely to do the same.
Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that Gn can never-the-less be written as the intersection
of two other independent events, W 1n ∩W 2n , where W in depends only on the private signals
of agent i. To define these events, we consider the perspective of on outside observer, who
observes {Dil} for i = 1, 2 and l < k, but has no access to the signals of either agents. This
outside observer can calculate, given Gk−1, whether there exists a trajectory which would
cause agent 1 (for example) to guess that Θ = +1 in the kth period, and, if so, what minimal
value of S1k would imply this. We define that value as tk, the “threshold” that S
1
k must be
under to imply the event Gk. By symmetry, the same threshold applies to agent 2, and
so S2k must also be under tk. Thus W
i
n is the event that agent i’s private signals are such
that Sik < tk for all k ≤ n. These are clearly conditionally independent events, and their
intersection is Gn.
We now formalize this construction, defining tk, W
1
k and W
2
k inductively. Let t1 = 0 and
let W 10 and W
2
0 be full measure events. For k ≥ 1 and i ∈ {1, 2}, let
W ik = W
i
k−1 ∩ {Sik ≤ tk} ,
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and for k > 1 let
tk = − 1
log(p/q)
· log P
+[W 2k−1]
P−[W 2k−1]
.(10)
We prove the following claim in the Appendix.
Claim 15.
W 1n ∩W 2n = Gn.
Note that it follows that tk is a non-negative number: the probability that both agents
play −1 at all times conditioned on Θ = −1 is clearly larger than the same probability,
conditioned on Θ = +1.
To analyze the events W in, we start by studying tn, and in particular its asymptotic
behavior, as described by
tˆ = lim inf
n
tn/n.
Denote also pˆ = 1
2
(1 + tˆ) and qˆ = 1 − pˆ. By the definition of tn we will equivalently need
to understand the asymptotic conditional probabilities P+[W 2n ] and P−[W 2n ]. We start by
analyzing the latter, and (by an easy exercise) show
Claim 16. For every 1/2 < p < 1 there is a constant C > 0 such that, for all k > 0,
C < P−[W 2n ].
We prove this in the appendix.
We next turn to understanding P+[W 2n ]. Now, conditioned on Θ = +1, S2n/n will, with
high probability, be approximately equal to 2p − 1. W 2n is (roughly) the event that it is
less than 2pˆ − 1. Hence, if pˆ < p, our experience from Sanov’s Theorem suggests that the
probability of W 2n , conditioned on Θ = +1 should be approximately e
−DKL(pˆ||p)n. Formally,
we show that indeed
Proposition 17. pˆ > p.
and that
Proposition 18. Let {ni}i be a sequence such that limi tni/ni = tˆ. Then
lim sup
n
−1
k
· logP+[W 2n ] = lim
i
− 1
ni
· logP+[W 2ni ] = DKL(pˆ||p) .
Both proofs appear in the appendix. We henceforth let {ni}i be such that limi tni/ni = tˆ.
Joining the latter proposition with Claim 16 yields that
lim
i
− 1
ni
· log P
+[W 2ni ]
P−[W 2ni ]
= lim
i
− 1
ni
· logP+[W 2ni ] = DKL(pˆ||p).
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Therefore, if we divide both sides of the definition of tn (10) by k and take limits along {ni}i,
we arrive at
tˆ =
DKL(pˆ||p)
log(p/q)
.(11)
Substituting pˆ = (1 + tˆ)/2 yields an equation for tˆ:
tˆ =
DKL(1/2(1 + tˆ)||p)
log(p/q)
.
Note that tˆ = 0 is not a solution of this equation, and so tˆ > 0 and pˆ > 1/2. Furthermore,
we know that pˆ < p. Therefore, and since DKL(·||p) is decreasing on [0, p)
tˆ =
DKL(pˆ||p)
log(p/q)
<
DKL(1/2||p)
log(p/q)
= t∗,
recalling the definition of t∗. Hence q∗ < qˆ. Another interesting consequence of (11) is that
Lemma 19. 2DKL(pˆ||p) = DKL(qˆ||p).
This follows by elementary algebraic manipulations of (11), which we omit. Returning to
Gn,
P+[Gn] = P+[W 1n ,W 2n ] = P+[W 1n ]2.
Hence, by Proposition 18,
gp = lim sup
n
−1
k
· logP+[Gn] = 2DKL(pˆ||p).
Thus, applying Lemma 19 yields
Theorem 20.
gp = DKL(qˆ||p) .
This appears in part (3) of Theorem 1. It follows that
dp ≤ DKL(qˆ||p) = DKL(1− pˆ || p).
Finally, since q∗ < qˆ, and since bp = DKL(q∗||p), it follows that
Theorem 21.
dp ≤ DKL(1− pˆ || p) < bp .
This is also in part (3) of Theorem 1.
The event Gn (conditioned on Θ = +1) implies that the agents both choose the wrong
action at all times. We have shown that this happens with probability that is exponentially
higher than that of agent 1 choosing the wrong action in the unidirectional observation
setting (see Figure 5, which compares gp to bp).
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Figure 5. gp (red) is lower than bp = cp (blue); that is, bidirectional obser-
vation causes an exponential increase in the probability of error. The graph is
normalized by ap.
6.0.3. Bayesian Groupthink. We next show that conditioned on the state of the world Θ =
+1 and the event Gn that both agents guessed incorrectly in all periods, the agents have,
with high probability, strong positive private signals. Thus both agents have strong evidence
indicating the correct action (+1), and yet take the wrong action (-1 or 0).
Theorem 22. For every  > 0
lim
n→∞
P
[
S1n/n > tˆ− , S2n/n > tˆ− 
∣∣Gn,Θ = +1] = 1.
That is, S1n and S
2
n are typically not less than about n · tˆ. We prove this in the appendix.
Theorem 22 may seem surprising at first: even though both agents guess the state incor-
rectly they both have evidence indicating the correct state. This is not the case in other
scenarios: for example, when two agents do not observe each other, when they are both
wrong it is obviously the case that both have signals indicating the wrong action.
To understand this, note that as each agent has seen the other taking the wrong action
repeatedly, she requires strong evidence in favor of the correct action, in order to switch to it.
As the action is incorrect by assumption, both agents will be approximately indifferent; this
follows from the “smallest possible mistake” principle (Theorem 10). Thus, conditioned on
both agents guessing wrong all the time, they both, in the long run, hold significant evidence
in favor of the true state.
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7. Conclusion
We have shown that increasing the exchange of information between two agents might
lead to exponentially slower learning. To prove this result we used tools from large deviation
theory, which we think might be useful also in other models of learning.
Of course, many questions remain open. First and foremost, we were not able to overcome
the hurdles involved in calculating the speed of learning in the bidirectional case, but only
provided an upper bound for it. Indeed, it is possible that the information transmission
efficiency is in fact zero in this case - we were not able to prove otherwise!
Another interesting question is to understand the limits of information transmission ef-
ficiency. What actions should the agents choose to maximize the information transmission
efficiency? Are there actions which would result in 100% efficiency in both directions, so
that both agent’s learning rate is 2ap? If not, what is the maximum possible rate achievable
by both agents?
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Appendix A. Additional proofs
The following is a Corollary of Sanov’s Theorem.
Corollary 23 (Generalized Sanov). Let 0 ≤ p
n
< pn ≤ 1 be a converging sequence of
intervals such that p = limn→∞ pn and p = limn→∞ pn. Then
lim
n→∞
− log 1
n
P+[2p
n
− 1 ≤ Sin/n ≤ 2pn − 1] =

DKL(p || p) when p < p
0 when p ≤ p ≤ p
DKL(p || p) when p < p
·
Proof. We consider the case that p < p; the rest of the cases follow by a similar argument.
Since limn pn = p, for every  > 0 it holds for all n sufficiently large that p− < pn < p+.
Additionally, when  < p− p, pn < p, again for large n. Hence, by Sanov’s Theorem,
DKL(p−  || p) ≤ lim
n→∞
− log 1
n
P+[2p
n
− 1 ≤ Sin/n ≤ 2pn − 1] ≤ DKL(p−  || p).
The claim follows by the continuity of the Kullback-Leibler divergence function DKL(· || p).

Proof of Proposition 7. Recall that the optimal action is +1 if the log-likelihood ratio LBn
is greater zero and −1 if it is smaller, and consider the expression for LBn given in (6). If
|Sn/n| > t∗n or A2n−1 = 0 then the first addend dominates the second, and therefore the sign
of LBn will equal the sign of S
1
n; this covers the first case.
If |Sn/n| < t∗n and A2n−1 6= 0 then the second addend is dominant, and hence sgn(LBn ) =
A2n−1; this covers the second case. Finally, if |Sn/n| = t∗n then the two addends are equal (in
absolute value, and when A2n−1 6= 0) and so the sign of their sum will equal the sign of the
average of their signs. This covers the third case. 
Proof of Proposition 13. We define
LCn := log
P+[{X1k}k≤n, {A2k}k<n]
P−[{X1k}k≤n, {A2k}k<n]
.
Applying Bayes’ rule and conditional independence, it follows that
LCn = S
1
n log
p
q
+ log
P+[{A2k}k<n]
P−[{A2k}k<n]
.
This is a function of S1n and {A2k}k<n. If Fn occurs, Sn/n < p∗ − ε, and A2k = −1 for every
1 ≤ k < n. Since C1n = sgnLCn , it is sufficient to show that, for these values, LCn is negative.
By Claim 6, we know that the event {{S2k < 0}k<n} is identical to {{A2k = −1}k<n}.
Therefore,
P−[{A2k = −1}k<n] ≥ P−[{S2k < 0}k<n] ≥
1
n− 1P
−[S2n−1 < 0] ,
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where the second inequality follows from Theorem 12. Conditioned on Θ = −1, the mean of
S2n/n is q − p, and its variance is Kpn for some Kp independent of n. Thus, by Chebyshev’s
Inequality,
P−[S2n−1 < 0] ≥ 1− ε
for any ε > 0 and n high enough. Meanwhile, the event {{A2k = −1}k<n} implies {S2n−1 ≤ 0}.
Therefore,
P+[{A2k = −1}k<n] ≤ P+[S2n−1 ≤ 0] ≤ exp[−(ap −K ′pε)n] ,
where the final inequality holds for any fixed K ′p > 0 independent of n, any ε > 0 sufficiently
small, and some sufficiently large n, by Sanov’s Theorem and the definition of ap.
Substituting this in to the log-likelihood ratio, we find that, conditioned on Fn,
LCn /n < (p
∗ − ε) log(p/q) + 1
n
log[(n− 1)/(1− ε)]− (ap −K ′pε) .
Noting that p∗ · log(p/q) = ap by definition, we see that this quantity is bounded above by
LCn /n ≤
1
n
log[(n− 1)/(1− ε)]− (log(p/q)−K ′p)ε .
If we choose K ′p <
1
2
log(p/q), the upper bound is negative for n large enough and ε small
enough, and, in particular, LCn is negative when Fn occurs. Since C
1
n = sgnL
C
n , we conclude
that Fn implies {C1n 6= +1}.

Proof of Claim 15. The claim holds at time 1, since D11 6= +1 iff S11 ≤ t1 = 0. Assume that
it holds up to time k − 1.
Pick integer t < tk such that P[W 1k−1,W 2k−1, S1k = t] is non-zero. Then the log-likelihood
ratio of the event Θ = +1 given W 1k−1,W
2
k−1 and S
1
k = t is
log
P+[W 1k−1,W 2k−1, S1k = t]
P−[W 1k−1,W 2k−1, S1k = t]
.
By the conditional independence of the signals, this can be separated into
log
P+[W 1k−1, S1k = t]
P−[W 1k−1, S1k = t]
+ log
P+[W 2k−1]
P−[W 2k−1]
.
The term on the left is equal to t log(p/q), since each of the probabilities is equal to the
number of paths satisfying W 1k−1 and satisfying S
1
k = t, times the probability of each path,
which is always equal. Hence the log-likelihood ratio is
t log(p/q) + log
P+[W 2k−1]
P−[W 2k−1]
,
which by the definition of tk is non-positive for any t ≤ tk, and positive when t > tk.
Therefore, given W 1k−1 and W
2
k−1, S
1
k ≤ tk is equivalent to this ratio being non-positive, and
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since this is agent 1’s log-likelihood ratio for Θ = +1, it is equivalent to D1k 6= +1. By
symmetry, W 1k−1 and W
2
k−1, S
2
k ≤ tk is equivalent to D2k 6= +1, proving the claim. 
Proof of Claim 16. Returning to the definition of W 2k , and since tk is positive, P−[W 2k ] is at
least the probability that S2l is negative for all l ≤ k, conditioned on Θ = −1. This, as the
probability that a simple random walk with a negative drift is always negative, is well known
to be bounded from below by a constant C independent of k (but not of p). 
Proof of Proposition 17. Assume the contrary. By Claim 16, there is a C > 0 such that
C < P−[W 2k ] for all k.
Now, recalling (13), for any ε > 0, there is an m such that
P+[W 2k ] ≥ P+[W 2m ∩ {S2l < (tˆ− ε)l}m<l≤k].
The assumption pˆ ≥ p implies tˆ > p − q, and therefore the event {S2l < (p − q − ε)l}m<l≤k
implies {S2l < (tˆ− ε)l}m<l≤k. Applying the Ballot Theorem and Sanov’s Theorem again, we
deduce that
P+[W 2k ] ≥
qm
k
e−(k−m)[DKL(p−ε||p)+ε],
after possibly increasing the value of k. Substituting this into (10), dividing through by k
and taking limits, we see that
tˆ < DKL(p− ε||p) + ε .
Since ε is arbitrary and DKL(·||p) is continuous, we conclude that tˆ = 0 and so pˆ = 1/2,
contradicting the assumption that pˆ ≥ p > 1/2. 
Proof of Proposition 18. By inclusion, P+[W 2k ] ≤ P+[S2k ≤ tk], and so, by Sanov’s Theorem
−1
k
logP+[W 2k ] ≥ −
1
k
logP+[S2k ≤ tk] ≥ −DKL(1/2(1 + tk/k)||p)− ε,
for every positive ε and k sufficiently large, and whenever tk/k is smaller than 2p− 1. Since
1
2
(1 + tˆ) = pˆ < p, this happens for all ni large enough.
Noting that ε is arbitrary, we conclude that
lim inf
i
− 1
ni
· logP+[W 2ni ] ≥ DKL(pˆ||p),
and that
lim sup
k
−1
k
· logP+[W 2k ] ≥ DKL(pˆ||p).(12)
It thus remains to be shown that this limit superior is at most DKL(pˆ||p).
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Moving to the lower bound, we fix ε > 0. Then there exists an m > 0 such that for all
l > m
tl > (tˆ− ε)l.
Then, from the definition of W 2k , we see that
P+[W 2k ] ≥ P+[W 2m ∩ {S2l /l < (tˆ− ε)}m<l≤k].(13)
Now, W 2m includes the event {S1l = −l}l≤m, which, conditioned on Θ = +1, has probability
qm. Hence
P+[W 2k ] ≥ qm · P+[{S2l /l < (tˆ− ε)}m<l≤k |S2m = −m].
By the Ballot Theorem (which adds a 1/k factor) and Sanov’s Theorem, it follows that
P+[W 2k ] ≥
qm
k
e−(k−m)[DKL(pˆ−ε||p)+ε],
after possibly increasing k. Taking the limit superior and noting that ε is arbitrary, we
deduce
lim sup
k
−1
k
· logP+[W 2k ] ≤ DKL(pˆ||p) ,
proving the claim. 
Proof of Theorem 22. By the definition of Gn and by the conditional independence of the
private signals,
P
[
S1n/n > tˆ− , S2n/n > tˆ− 
∣∣Gn,Θ = +1] = P [S1n/n > tˆ− ∣∣S1n/n ≤ tn/n,Θ = +1]2 .
Let pn = P
[
S1n/n > tˆ− 
∣∣S1n/n ≤ tn/n,Θ = +1] be the probability of the event on the right
hand side. Then
1− pn = P
[
S1n/n ≤ tˆ− 
∣∣S1n/n ≤ tn/n,Θ = +1] .
By Bayes’ Theorem
1− pn = P
+[S1n/n ≤ tˆ− , S1n/n ≤ tn/n]
P+[S1n/n ≤ tn/n]
,
and for n large enough tn/n > tˆ− , and so
1− pn = P
+[S1n/n ≤ tˆ− ]
P+[S1n/n ≤ tn/n]
.
Since tn/n ≤ tˆ− /2 for all n large enough, we have that the denominator
P+[S1n/n ≤ tn/n] ≥ P+[S1n/n ≤ tˆ− /2],
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and so
1− pn ≤ P
+[S1n/n ≤ tˆ− ]
P+[S1n/n ≤ tˆ− /2]
.
Taking logarithms, dividing by n, and taking and limits we get that
lim
n
− 1
n
log(1− pn) ≥ lim
n
− 1
n
logP+[S1n/n ≤ tˆ− ]− lim
n
− 1
n
logP+[S1n/n ≤ tˆ− /2].
Keeping in mind that 1
2
(tˆ−1) = pˆ < p, and applying Sanov’s Theorem to each of the addends
in the right hand side, we get that
lim
n
− 1
n
log(1− pn) ≥ DKL(pˆ− /2||p)−DKL(pˆ− /4||p).
Since pˆ < p it follows that that
lim
n
− 1
n
log 1− pn > 0
and so
lim
n
pn = 1.

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